We study the design of pricing mechanisms and auctions when the mechanism designer does not know the distribution of buyers' values. Instead the mechanism designer receives a set of samples from this distribution and his goal is to use the sample to design a pricing mechanism or auction with high expected profit. We provide generalization guarantees which bound the difference between average profit on the sample and expected profit over the distribution. These bounds are directly proportional to the intrinsic complexity of the mechanism class the designer is optimizing over. We present a single, overarching theorem that uses empirical Rademacher complexity to measure the intrinsic complexity of a variety of widely-studied singleand multi-item auction classes, including affine maximizer auctions, mixed-bundling auctions, and second-price item auctions. This all-encompassing theorem also applies to multi-and singleitem pricing mechanisms in both multi-and single-unit settings, such as linear and non-linear pricing mechanisms. Despite the extensive applicability of our main theorem, we match and improve over the best-known generalization guarantees for many mechanism classes. Finally, our central theorem allows us to easily derive generalization guarantees for every class in several finely grained hierarchies of auction and pricing mechanism classes. We demonstrate how to determine the precise level in a hierarchy with the optimal tradeoff between profit and generalization using structural profit maximization. The mechanism classes we study are significantly different from well-understood function classes typically found in machine learning, so bounding their complexity requires a sharp understanding of the interplay between mechanism parameters and buyer valuations.
Introduction
Machine learning is an indispensable tool for large-scale mechanism design given the vast quantity of consumer data companies have at their disposal. Its applicability to mechanism design is a natural consequence of a standard assumption made in economics: a buyer's value for a bundle of goods is defined by a probability distribution over all the possible valuations he might have for that bundle. In the model most applicable to machine learning, the mechanism designer receives a sample from this distribution and his goal is to derive a mechanism that will have high expected profit.
A recent line of work has augmented the sample-based mechanism design literature with provable guarantees via learning-theoretic analyses. For example, given a set of samples from the distribution over buyers' values, a natural way to determine a mechanism that will likely have strong performance over the distribution is to choose one with high average profit over the sample. Implicit in this procedure is the assumption that a mechanism's performance on the sample will generalize to the distribution. For a fixed mechanism class A, a bound on the difference between the average profit (a) Multi-unit pricing mechanisms (b) Single-unit pricing mechanisms Figure 1 : The hierarchies of pricing mechanism families studied in this paper. Generality increases upwards in the hierarchies. over the sample and the expected profit on the distribution for any mechanism in A is known as a generalization guarantee. These guarantees are often highly dependent on the intrinsic complexity of the class A and we use tools from learning theory such as pseudo-dimension and Rademacher complexity to bound this quantity. Bounding the complexity of a class is the bottleneck in deriving strong generalization guarantees.
Despite the expanding literature on sample-based mechanism design, there is not yet a unifying framework guiding the derivation of complexity bounds for both simple mechanisms such as takeit-or-leave-it pricing mechanisms and more combinatorially challenging VCG-based mechanisms such as affine maximizer auctions (AMAs). Existing frameworks apply to "simple" mechanisms that can be reduced to the single-buyer setting [Morgenstern and or only to specific learning algorithms that return the mechanism with empirically maximal profit [Syrgkanis, 2017] . Determining the empirically optimal mechanism is typically not feasible for highly complex mechanism classes such as affine maximizer auctions.
In this work, we extract the common features linking mechanisms that have been studied in the sample-based mechanism design literature as well as many more. Taking advantage of this structure, ...we present one overarching theorem that bounds the intrinsic complexity of a wide swath of mechanism classes, from simple take-it-or-leave-it pricing mechanisms to complex VCG-based auctions such as affine maximizer auctions.
We measure intrinsic complexity using empirical Rademacher complexity, a learning theoretic notion that we define in Section 3. Our all-encompassing theorem immediately implies strong generalization guarantees for every mechanism class it applies to. See Figures 1 and 2 for hierarchical depictions of the mechanism classes we study. Surprisingly, despite the theorem's generality and widespread applicability, it matches or improves upon the best-known generalization guarantees for many of the auction classes already studied in the literature.
Next, we apply this machinery to a learning framework known as structural profit maximization (SPM). Even if the mechanism designer does not have enough samples to learn over a highly complex class such as the class of affine maximizer auctions with sufficiently low generalization error, all is not lost. He can split the class into a finely grained hierarchy of auction classes, apply our main theorem to each class in the hierarchy, and use structural profit maximization to determine the precise level in the hierarchy that will assure him the optimal tradeoff between profit maximization and generalization. For example, we introduce several hierarchies of affine maximizer auctions, a family that was first introduced by Roberts [Roberts, 1979] . At a high level, an AMA is defined by a set of bidder weights w i , where all of Bidder i's bids are increased multiplicatively by a factor of w i , and outcome boosts, where the social welfare of any allocation Q is increased additively by a Figure 2 : The hierarchy of auction families studied in this paper. Generality increases upwards in the hierarchy. factor of λ(Q). The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism is then run on this transformed bid space. For any set of allocations O, we introduce the class of O-boosted AMAs, where only allocations in O are boosted. More generally, the class of k-sparse AMAs consists of those auctions where at most k outcomes are boosted. Structural profit maximization allows the mechanism designer to determine the class O or the sparsity k that guarantees the optimal tradeoff between profit and generalization.
We also apply our main theorem and the SPM learning framework to pricing mechanisms. The pricing mechanisms we study fall into two categories: single-unit and multi-unit. In the multi-unit setting, we study both linear and non-linear unit prices. Non-linear pricing allows the mechanism designer to set differing costs per unit. For example, he may offer a discount for each additional unit that the buyer buys. Non-linear pricing is ubiquitous throughout many sectors of the economy, such as the shipping industry, electricity market, cellular service market, air travel industry, and advertising industry [Wilson, 1993] . A two-part tariff is one of the simplest examples of non-linear pricing. It consists of a fixed, up-front fee charged to each buyer that buys at least one unit of the good and a price per unit bought. The fixed fee is often described as a installation, access, or subscription charge. Oftentimes, producers will offer a menu of two-part tariffs from which the buyer chooses a payment plan. As Wilson describes, offering a menu of two-part tariffs is often equivalent to offering a multipart tariff. A multipart tariff consists of a fixed fee and b different marginal prices that apply in different volume bands or intervals. When the marginal prices are successively decreasing, a multipart tariff is equivalent to offering a menu of b two-part tariffs [Wilson, 1993] .
In the single-unit setting, the simplest mechanism we study is an item-pricing mechanism, where each item has a price. Buyers arrive one at a time in a fixed but arbitrary order to buy the bundle maximizing their utility among the remaining items. We also study generalizations such as B-pricing mechanisms, where B is a set of bundles and every bundle in B is given a price. Buyers arrive one at a time to buy the bundle maximizing their utility among the remaining items. The class of (B 1 , . . . , B n )-pricing mechanisms generalizes the class of B-pricing mechanisms to include non-anonymous prices.
We show that when the buyers have simple valuations, such as additive or unit-demand valuations, "simple" mechanisms become even simpler, in that our upper bounds on their empirical Rademacher complexity shrink. Empirical Rademacher complexity is a modern complexity measure used for obtaining data-dependent, beyond-worst-case generalization guarantees in learning theory [Bartlett and Mendelson, 2002 , Koltchinskii, 2001 , Shalev-Shwartz and Ben-David, 2014 , Mohri et al., 2012 . Empirical Rademacher complexity can be measured on the sample and implies generalization guarantees that improve based on structure exhibited by the sample. Therefore, the mechanism designer need not know a priori whether the buyers are additive or unit-demand in order to benefit from these improved guarantees. Rather, if their valuations are simple, this will be reflected in the empirical Rademacher complexity of the simple mechanism classes we study, and as a result, the mechanism designer can derive the strong guarantees afforded by simple buyers. Tables 1, 2, and 3 display each mechanism class A together with the generalization guarantee upper bound we derive in this work. 1 Formally, for a class of mechanisms A, we denote our generalization guarantee using the notation A (N, δ), where with probability at least 1 − δ over the draw of a sample of size N , for all mechanisms in the class A, average profit over the sample is A (N, δ)-close to expected profit over the distribution. A generalization guarantee can easily be converted to a sample complexity guarantee N A ( , δ), where with probability at least 1 − δ over the draw of a sample of size N A ( , δ), for every mechanism in A, average profit is -close to expected profit.
For several of the mechanism classes we study, we improve over the previously best-known generalization guarantees. First of all, we prove generalization bounds for several "simple" mechanism classes when the buyers have valuation profiles not studied by Morgenstern and Roughgarden [Morgenstern and Roughgarden, 2016] . For example, Morgenstern and Roughgarden studied item pricing mechanism when the buyers have general and additive valuations, and we prove improved bounds when the buyers have unit-demand valuations. Similarly, we provide generalization bounds [Balcan et al., 2016] . The bound in this paper is significantly simpler, applies to the multi-unit setting, and does not rely on the range of the parameter space. We also improve over Balcan et al.'s gener-
for mixed bundling auctions with reserve prices (MBARPs) and our proof is significantly simpler [Balcan et al., 2016] .
Structural profit maximization. Given the many mechanism classes and generalization guarantees at the mechanism designer's disposal, we call upon a learning framework known as structural risk minimization in Section 5 which allows the mechanism designer to determine the class with the optimal tradeoff between profit maximization and generalization guarantees. Since we are maximizing profit, not minimizing risk, we refer to this framework as structural profit maximization (SPM). Prior work has only given uniform generalization bounds which guarantee that for any mechanism A in a class A, the profit of A over the sample is within a fixed range from the expected profit of A, no matter how simple A is. This is illustrated in the left panel of Figure 3 . Meanwhile, we provide a range of generalization bounds which guarantee that the difference between the expected and empirical profit of A is roughly proportionally to the complexity of A. This is illustrated in the right panel of Figure 3 . SPM allows the mechanism designer to optimize complexity versus profit. For example, suppose that the mechanism designer wants to design a B-pricing mechanism and he has some domain knowledge which assures him that buyers are interested only in bundles of size at most k, for some k ∈ N. This means that he can fix his design space to be the class of B-pricing mechanisms where B is the set of all bundles with size at most k. For example, in the transportation domain, airline companies bid on time slot allocations [Rassenti et al., 1982] , shipping companies bid on railroad track usage [Brewer and Plott, 1996] , and bus operators bid on routes [Cramton et al., 2006] . In these scenarios, buyers might only be interested in bundles of some capped size, since they are naturally constrained by the number of vehicles they have available and the number of crew members they have on staff. However, if the mechanism designer does not know k in advance then he may use our SPM results to find the class of B-pricing mechanisms with the optimal tradeoff between profit and generalization. In particular, the larger B is, the more likely it is that the corresponding mechanism class will contain a mechanism with high profit, roughly speaking. Unfortunately, this rich mechanism class will have worse generalization guarantees than a class defined by a smaller set of bundles. SPM, as we describe in more detail later in this paper, allows the mechanism designer to make an educated decision when determining which maximum bundle size will assure him the best profit and generalization guarantees in conjunction. We show how the benefits of SPM similarly hold for the many other mechanism hierarchies we study.
Key challenges. A major strength of our generalization guarantees is their applicability to any algorithm that determines the optimal mechanism over the sample, a nearly optimal approximation, or any other black box procedure. For example, our results apply to any algorithm that uses samples to optimize over the classes of AMAs or virtual valuation combinatorial auctions (VVCAs), such as those developed by Sandholm and Likhodedov [Sandholm and Likhodedov, 2015] . However, generalization guarantees over the full classes of AMAs and VVCAs have proven pessimistic, growing exponentially with the number of items [Balcan et al., 2016] . The SPM framework can ameliorate these worst-case bounds, but depends on a set of hierarchies breaking up these complex mechanism classes. The development of these hierarchies is the first challenge we address in this work. We require that these hierarchies be both economically sensible, permitting the mechanism designer to incorporate his prior knowledge about the buyers, and fine-grained, allowing the designer to utilize the SPM framework and thereby find an optimal tradeoff between profit and generalization.
Moreover, we favor hierarchies whose lower layers are much less complex than the full classes of AMAs and VVCAs, which raises a second key challenge: understanding the structure of these mechanism classes in order to bound their empirical Rademacher complexity. We observe that these mechanism classes are unlike many well-understood function classes in machine learning, where there is typically a simple connection between the parameter space and hypothesis space. For example, in linear or polynomial regression, there is a straight-forward mapping from the parameters of a hypothesis to its output on a given example, and a small change in parameters will lead to a predictable change in output. In our context, we discover that on a given bidding instance, the mechanism parameter space is shattered into regions such that the profit of a mechanism defined by parameters from one region is essentially unrelated to that of another. Roughly speaking, the number of significantly different profit functions over the range of parameters translates to the empirical Rademacher complexity of the mechanism class over the sample. As a result, we need to understand the structure of the partition induced on the parameter space by the sample in order to derive our generalization guarantees. In light of our analyses, we believe that this work is of auction-theoretic interest, since we develop novel insights into the structure of these well-studied mechanisms, as well as learning-theoretic interest, since we study function classes that diverge from those well-understood classes typically found in machine learning.
Related literature
The sample complexity of revenue maximization has proven to be a fruitful research area over the past several years [Elkind, 2007 , Cole and Roughgarden, 2014 , Huang et al., 2015 , Medina and Mohri, 2014 , Morgenstern and Roughgarden, 2015 , Roughgarden and Schrijvers, 2016 , Morgenstern and Roughgarden, 2016 , Balcan et al., 2016 , Syrgkanis, 2017 . Unlike this work, previous work has primarily concentrated on the single-item setting, with the exception of work by Morgenstern and Roughgarden, Balcan et al., and Syrgkanis [Morgenstern and Roughgarden, 2016 , Balcan et al., 2016 , Syrgkanis, 2017 . Learning theory tools such as pseudo-dimension and Rademacher complexity were used by Medina and Mohri, Balcan et al., Morgenstern and Roughgarden, and Syrgkanis to prove strong guarantees [Medina and Mohri, 2014 , Balcan et al., 2016 , Morgenstern and Roughgarden, 2015 , Morgenstern and Roughgarden, 2016 , Syrgkanis, 2017 . In a similar direction, Feldman et al. and Hsu et al. have developed bounds on the sample complexity of welfare-optimal item pricing mechanisms [Feldman et al., 2015 , Hsu et al., 2016 . Earlier work of Balcan et al. addressed sample complexity results for revenue maximization in unrestricted supply settings [Balcan et al., 2008] .
Morgenstern and Roughgarden proved both generalization guarantees and bounded the difference between the maximum revenue achievable via a single-item t-level auction and the revenue achievable via Myerson's optimal auction [Morgenstern and Roughgarden, 2015] . In this way, the authors study the trade-off between generalization and revenue guarantees in the single-item case, though in a worst-case sense. In contrast, we analyze this tradeoff for the multi-item, multi-unit setting and in a data-dependent, beyond-worst-case sense.
Sample-based mechanism design is closely related to automated mechanism design, a research area where revenue maximization in multi-item settings is a central topic. The goal is to design algorithms which take as input information about a set of buyers and return a mechanism that will extract high revenue from those buyers [Conitzer and Sandholm, 2002, Sandholm, 2003] . The input information about the buyers could be an explicit description of their priors or, as in this paper, a set of samples from their priors [Likhodedov and Sandholm, 2004 , Likhodedov and Sandholm, 2005 , Sandholm and Likhodedov, 2015 . Recently, automated mechanism design has been explored for applications beyond revenue maximization, such as mechanism design without money and more general assignment problems [Narasimhan and .
Affine maximizer auctions were introduced by Roberts, who proved that they are the only ex post strategy-proof mechanisms over unrestricted domains of valuations [Roberts, 1979] . Lavi et al. went on to prove that under certain natural assumptions, every incentive compatible multi-item auction is an "almost" affine maximizer, i.e. an AMA for sufficiently high valuations [Lavi et al., 2003 ]. Lavi et al. conjecture that the "almost" qualifier is merely technical, and can be removed in future research.
There is a wealth of work on characterizing the optimal multi-item auction for restricted settings and designing mechanisms which achieve high, if not optimal revenue in specific contexts (e.g. [Daskalakis and Weinberg, 2012 , Cai et al., 2012 , Cai et al., 2013 ). Revenue-maximizing mechanism design complements a research area which strives to answer the question: can simple mechanisms achieve near-optimal revenue [Hartline and Roughgarden, 2009] ? Recent work has shown that many of the mechanism classes we study achieve constant-factor approximations to the optimal revenue in certain settings, including item pricing mechanisms and grand bundle pricing mechanisms (e.g. [Chawla et al., 2007 , Chawla et al., 2010 , Hart and Nisan, 2012 , Kleinberg and Weinberg, 2012 , Babaioff et al., 2014 , Cai et al., 2016 ) and a special case of B-pricing mechanisms known as partition mechanisms [Babaioff et al., 2014 , Rubinstein, 2016 . We note that these approximation guarantees only hold in certain settings, such as when the buyers are unit-demand or subadditive. This highlights a strength of our results: our data-dependent bounds adapt nicely to the structure of the buyers, and we do not need to know this structure a priori in order to derive the improved guarantees that simple buyers afford. Further, even if the buyers do not have well-structured valuations, we can nevertheless bound generalizability.
Preliminaries, notation, and the mechanism hierarchies
We consider the problem of selling m heterogeneous goods to n consumers. We denote a bundle of goods as a quantity vector q and we denote the i th component of q as q[i]. Accordingly, the bundle consisting only of the i th item is denoted by the standard basis vector e i , where e[i] = 1 and e[j] = 0 for all j = i. In the single-unit case, q ∈ {0, 1} m . Each consumer i ∈ [n] has a valuation function v i over bundles of goods. If one bundle q 0 is contained within another bundle q 1 (i.e., q 0
and v i (0) = 0. We denote an allocation as Q = (q 1 , . . . , q n ) where q i is the bundle of goods that consumer i receives under allocation Q. There is an unknown distribution D over buyers' values.
In the multi-unit setting, we assume that the seller has a cost function c(Q) which equals the amount it costs the seller to produce the goods allocated under Q. We need to make a simple assumption about the total number of units demanded by the consumers or else the pseudo-dimension of many mechanism classes we study will be infinite. We assume that the cost function naturally caps the total number of units of each item that the producer will supply. In other words, for each item i, there is some cap κ i such that for all valuation functions in the support of D, it will cost the producer more to produce κ i units of item i than the buyers are willing to pay. Formally, this means that there exists a vector (κ 1 , . . . , κ m ) such that for all valuation vectors in the support of D and for all allocations Q = (q 1 , . . . , q m ), if there exists an item i such that n j=1 q j
In the multi-unit setting, there are m i=1 κ i +n n different allocations possible. This is because the number of ways to allocate at most κ i unlabeled units among n consumers is κ i +n n . In the single-unit setting, the number of different allocations is (n + 1) m because each of the m items can go to one of the n buyers or to no one. We denote the total number of different quantity vectors as K. In the multi-unit setting, K = m i=1 (κ i + 1) and in the single-unit setting, K = 2 m . We use the notation v 1 = (v 1 (q 1 ) , . . . , v 1 (q K )) and v = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) to denote a vector of consumer valuation functions. In the multi-item setting, we study consumers with general valuations. In the single-item setting, we study consumers with general,
We say that profit A (v) is the profit of a mechanism A on the valuation vector v. Denoting the payment of any one consumer i under mechanism A given valuation vector v as p i,A (v) and the outcome as
). Throughout this work, we study mechanisms parameterized by a vector p ∈ R d for some d, and we refer to the profit of the mechanism defined by p on the valuation vector v as profit p (v). If we fix v and consider the profit as a function of p, then we use the notation profit v (p). Finally, we define U D,A to be an upper bound on the profit achievable by any mechanism in the class A over the support of D. For the sake of readability, we drop the subscript when the mechanism class and distribution are clear from context. Many of the auction classes that we consider have a design based on the classic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism (VCG) [Vickrey, 1961 , Clarke, 1971 , Groves, 1973 . The VCG allocates the items such that the social welfare of the bidders, that is, the sum of their valuations for the allocated items, is maximized. Each winning bidder then pays her bid minus a "rebate" equal to the increase in welfare attributable to her presence in the auction. We note that every auction in the classes we study is incentive compatible, so we may assume that the bids equal the bidders' valuations.
Mechanism classes
We now define the mechanism families in the hierarchies we study. See Figures 1 and 2 for the hierarchical organization of the mechanism classes, together with the papers that introduced each family.
Multi-unit pricing mechanisms
First, we describe the pricing mechanisms we study, beginning with multi-unit mechanisms. All of these mechanisms can utilize either anonymous or non-anonymous prices. Under an anonymous pricing mechanism each consumer is subject to the same prices as every other consumer. Under a non-anonymous pricing mechanism different consumers are subject to different prices. This typically results in higher profit.
Non-linear pricing mechanisms. This paper studies non-linear pricing under the bundling interpretation described in Chapter 4.3 of Wilson's book on non-linear pricing [Wilson, 1993] . The mechanism designer sets a price per quantity vector q denoted p(q). Consumer j will purchase the bundle that maximizes v j (q) − p(q).
Additively decomposable non-linear pricing mechanisms. There exists m functions p i :
Two-part tariffs. A two-part tariff is a non-linear pricing scheme for a single good made up of two parts: 1) A fixed, up-front fee charged to each consumer who buys at least one unit of the good and 2) A price per unit bought. We denote a menu of M two-part tariffs as p 1 0 , p 1 1 , . . . , p M 0 , p M 1 , where p i 0 , p i 1 is the i th entry on the menu with a fixed fee p i 0 and a price per unit p i 1 . Each consumer can choose his payment plan among any of the M menu entries. Since there is only one item, we denote the cap on the total number of units the producer will supply as κ.
Single-unit pricing mechanisms
For single-unit pricing mechanisms, we assume that there is some fixed but arbitrary ordering on the consumers such that the first consumer in the ordering arrives first at the marketplace and buys the bundle of goods that maximizes his utility, then the next consumer in the ordering arrives at the marketplace and buys the bundle of remaining goods that maximizes his utility, and so on. We assume that this ordering over bidders is known to the mechanism designer. It is important for the mechanism designer to know this ordering in the single-unit setting because the order in which heterogeneous consumers arrive at the marketplace could affect profit drastically. In this setting, we assume the seller does not have a cost function.
Bundle pricing mechanisms. First, we define bundle pricing mechanisms with non-anonymous reserve prices, which we refer to as (B 1 , . . . , B n )-pricing mechanisms, where B 1 , . . . , B n are sets of bundles. Each bundle (or equivalently, quantity vector) q ∈ B i has a buyer-specific reserve price p i (q). We require that the singleton set e j is in B i for each item j ∈ [m] and each buyer i ∈ [n] so that if q ∈ B i , then we define p i (q) = j:q[j]=1 p i (e j ). In the case of anonymous reserve prices, we refer to the mechanism as a B-pricing mechanism, where B = B 1 = · · · = B n and p 1 = · · · = p n .
Item pricing mechanisms. Item pricing mechanisms are a special case of bundle pricing mechanisms where only the bundles consisting of a single item receive prices.
Multi-unit auction classes
Next we define the multi-unit auction classes we study in this work.
Affine maximizer auctions (AMAs). An AMA A is defined by a set of weights per bidder w j ∈ R >0 and boosts per allocation λ (Q) ∈ R. These parameters allow the mechanism designer to multiplicatively boost any bidder's bids by their corresponding weight and to increase the likelihood that any allocation Q is returned as the output of an auction by increasing λ(Q). More concretely, the allocation Q * of an AMA A is the one which maximizes the weighted social welfare, i.e. Q * = argmax
The payment function of A has the same form as the VCG payment rule, with the parameters factored in to ensure incentive compatibility. For all j ∈ [n], the payments are 
for all allocations Q that give Bidder i exactly bundle q.
Single-unit auction classes
As in the case of single-unit pricing mechanisms, we assume the seller does not has a cost function.
VCG auctions with anonymous bundle reserves. Each auction is defined by a set of bundles B and each bundle q ∈ B has a reserve price p(q). We require that B contains the singleton bundle e j for all items j ∈ [m]. This way, if a bundle q is not in B, then we define the reserve price of q to be p(q) = j:q[j]=1 p(e j ). For an outcome Q, let q Q be the bundle of items not allocated. The allocation Q * of this auction is the one that maximizes
Mixed bundling auctions with reserve prices (MBARPs). The class of mixed bundling auctions (MBAs) is parameterized by a constant c ≥ 0 which can be seen as a discount for any bidder who receives the grand bundle. Formally, the c-MBA is the λ-auction with λ(Q) = c if some bidder receives the grand bundle in allocation Q and 0 otherwise. 3 MBARPs are identical to MBAs though with reserve prices. In a single-item VCG auction (i.e. second price auction) with a reserve price, the item is only sold if the highest bidder's bid exceeds the reserve price, and the winner must pay the maximum of the second highest bid and the reserve price. To generalize this intuition to the multi-item case, we enlarge the set of agents to include the seller, who is now Bidder 0 and whose valuation for a set of items is the set's reserve price. Working with this expanded set of agents, the bidder weights are all 1 and the λ terms are the same as in the standard MBA setup. Importantly, the seller makes no payments, no matter her allocation. More formally, given a vector of valuation functions v, the MBARP allocation is
Learning theory background
In this work, we are concerned with generalization guarantees for uniformly learnable classes of mechanisms. We begin with a formal definition of these concepts.
Definition 3.1 (Uniformly learnable). A class A is uniformly learnable if there exists a function A (N, δ) such that for any δ ∈ (0, 1), with probability at least 1 − δ over the draw of a sample of size N from the distribution over buyers' values D, for any mechanism A in A, the difference between the average profit of A over the sample and its expected profit over D is at most A (N, δ) .
The function A (N, δ) is known as a generalization guarantee for learning over the class A. Learning theorists have developed many tools to help derive generalization guarantees such as empirical Rademacher complexity and pseudo-dimension which quantify the "complexity" of a class of functions. First, we formally define empirical Rademacher complexity in terms of mechanism profit functions and then provide a more intuitive notion of the quantity that it measures. Throughout this paper, we slightly abuse notation and use A both to refer to a class of mechanisms and the class of those mechanisms' profit functions. Definition 3.2 (Empirical Rademacher complexity). The empirical Rademacher complexity of A with respect to the sample S = v 1 , . . . , v N is defined as
Intuitively, the supremum measures, for a given sample S and Rademacher vector σ, the maximum correlation between profit A v i and σ i over all A ∈ A. Taking the expectation over σ, we can then say that the empirical Rademacher complexity of A measures the ability of profit functions from A (when applied to a fixed sample S) to fit random noise. We are able to derive strong sample complexity bounds with empirical Rademacher complexity. For example, the following bound is well-known. Moreover, for a sample S, suppose profitÂ ∈ A is a profit function with the maximum average value over S and profit A * is a function with maximum expected value with respect to the distribution D. Then with probability at least 1 − δ,
The pseudo-dimension of a mechanism class A is another means of analyzing the complexity of A, and thereby deriving useful generalization guarantees. To define pseudo-dimension, let S = v 1 , . . . , v N be a sample drawn from D and let (r 1 , . . . , r N ) ∈ R N be a set of targets. We say that (r 1 , . . . , r N ) witnesses the shattering of S by A if for all T ⊆ S, there exists some mechanism A T ∈ A such that for all v i ∈ T , profit A T v i ≤ r i and for all v i ∈ T , profit A T v i > r i . If there exists some r that witnesses the shattering of S by A, then we say that S is shatterable by A. Finally, the pseudo-dimension of A is the size of the largest set that is shatterable by A. The following theorem is well-known. 
Generalization guarantees
In this section, we uncover structural connections between the mechanism classes that we study which allow us to abstractly reason about their Rademacher complexity. The profit function depends first and foremost on the allocation made to each of the buyers. In the case of pricing mechanisms, profit is completely determined once these allocations are set. Meanwhile, the auction classes we study are variants on the classic VCG mechanism, so the profit also depends on the n allocations that would be made without each buyer's participation in turn. Once all of these n + 1 allocations are fixed, the payment function is simple -it is a linear function of the auction's Figure 4 : An illustration of the partition induced on R 2 ≥0 by the scenario described in Example 4.1.
parameters and the buyers' valuations for each of the n + 1 allocations. The challenge of bounding the complexity of these classes of mechanisms therefore comes down to understanding the connection between a mechanism's parameters and the resulting allocation, or in the case of auctions, the resulting n + 1 relevant allocations on a given valuation vector. We can often partition the mechanism parameter space into a finite number of regions over which these allocations are fixed for a given valuation vector and over which the profit is a fixed linear function. The following example illustrates the partition induced on R 2 ≥0 by a specific valuation profile and the VCG auction with anonymous item reserve prices.
Example 4.1. Suppose that there are two bidders and two items for sale in the single-unit setting. Bidder 1 has the valuation function v 1 ((1, 0)) = 3, v 1 ((0, 1)) = 4, and v 1 ((1, 1)) = 6. Bidder 2 has the valuation function v 2 ((1, 0)) = 5, v 2 ((0, 1)) = 3, and v 2 ((1, 1)) = 6. We analyze the class of VCG auctions with anonymous item reserves, so the auction's parameters are in R 2 ≥0 . First, we show that R 2 ≥0 can be partitioned into 4 regions so that if (p((1, 0)), p((0, 1))) and (p ((1, 0)), p ((0, 1))) are from the same region, the outcome of the resulting VCG auction will be the same. To this end, notice that the allocation ((0, 1), (1, 0)), where Bidder 1 receives item 2 and Bidder 2 receives item 1, will be the allocation of any auction so long as v 1 ((0, 1)) + v 2 ((1, 0)) ≥ v 1 (q 1 ) + v 2 (q 2 ) + p (q Q ) for any allocation Q. Simple calculations show that this will be the case so long as p ((1, 0) ) ≤ 5 and p((0, 1)) ≤ 4. Along the same lines, the allocation will be ((0, 1), (0, 0)) so long as p ((1, 0) ) ≥ 5 and p((0, 1)) ≤ 4 and the allocation will be ((0, 0), (1, 0)) so long as p ((1, 0) ) ≤ 5 and p((0, 1)) ≥ 4. Otherwise, the allocation is ((0, 0), (0, 0)). This is illustrated by Figure 4 (a), where p ((1, 0) ) scales along the x-axis and p((0, 1)) scales along the y-axis.
In Figure 4 (b) we perform the same analysis in the case where Bidder 2 is not present in the auction and Figure 4(c) shows the same analysis when Bidder 1 is not present in the auction. Finally, Figure 4(d) displays the overlay of these three partitions. By construction, the profit in each region is a linear function of the prices. For example, consider the region marked by a star. From Figure 4(a) , we know that the allocation of auction defined by any price pair from this region is ((0, 1), (1, 0)). From Figure 4(b) , the allocation without Bidder 2's participation is ((0, 0), (0, 0)), and from Figure 4(c) , the allocation without Bidder 1's participation is ((0, 0), (0, 1)). Therefore, Bidder 1 pays v 2 ((0, 1))+p((1, 0))−v 2 ((1, 0)) = p((1, 0))−2 and Bidder 2 pays p((1, 0))+p((0, 1))− v 1 ((0, 1)) = p((1, 0)) + p((0, 1)) − 4, so the profit in this region is 2p((1, 0)) + p((0, 1)) − 6, a linear function of (p ((1, 0) ), p((0, 1))).
In this section, we show that the empirical Rademacher complexity of a class of mechanisms can be bounded by a function of both the number of regions an arbitrary sample induces on the parameter space and the dimension of the parameter space. We find that mechanisms that have been deemed "simple" in the literature often admit partitions that are small and easy to characterize over a low-dimensional parameter space. We also demonstrate that the complexity of the partition induced by a sample, and thus the empirical Rademacher complexity of a class of mechanisms over that sample, is intricately bound to the complexity of the buyers. Since empirical Rademacher complexity is a measurement the mechanism designer can make on the sample, he can count or bound the number of regions induced by the sample on the parameter space and calculate his generalization guarantee accordingly. In this way, he does not need to make any assumption about whether the distribution is over simple buyers or not.
We now present our main empirical Rademacher complexity guarantee, which we then instantiate for a wide variety of mechanisms. These bounds immediately imply the generalization guarantee upper bounds listed in Tables 1, 2, and 3 by Theorem 3.3.
Theorem 4.2. Let F be a class of mechanism profit functions such that each mechanism is parameterized by a vector p ∈ X ⊆ R d and let S = v 1 , . . . , v N be a sample of valuation vectors. Suppose that there are at most r regions partitioning X such that on each sample
Proof. Suppose that N is the size of the largest shatterable set, so P dim(F) = N . As we see in Lemma 4.3, it must be that N ≤ d log N +log(rd). We can deduce that N ≤ 4d log(2d)+2 log(rd) = O(d log d+log r) by using the fact that for c ≥ 1 and b > 0, if x ≤ c log x+b, then x ≤ 4c log (2c) Lemma 4.3. Let F be a class of mechanism profit functions such that each mechanism is parameterized by a vector p ∈ X ⊆ R d and let S = v 1 , . . . , v N be a shatterable sample of valuation vectors. Suppose that there are at most r regions partitioning X such that on each sample v i , profit v i (p) is linear as p ranges over a single region R, i.e. profit v i (p) = u i R · p + a R for some u i R ∈ R d and a R ∈ R. Then N ≤ d log N + log(rd)
Proof. Since S is shatterable, there must be a set of N targets r 1 , . . . , r N that witness the shattering of S by F. In other words, for all T ⊆ [N ], there exists a parameter vector p T such that
We refer to the set of these 2 N special vectors p T as P . Since the regions R partition the parameter space X , we know that each parameter vector in P comes from some region R. We will now count the maximum number of vectors in P from a single arbitrary region R. Fix a region R and a single sample v i with its corresponding witness. For a single sample v i , we know that profit v i (p) = u i R · p + a R . The set of all p such that u i R · p + a R is less than its witness r i form a halfspace defined by the hyperplane u i R · p + a R = r i . There exists one such hyperplane per sample, leading to a total of N hyperplanes. These hyperplanes induce a partition of R consisting of at most dN d cells [Buck, 1943] . By construction, as we range p over any one cell, for all i ∈ [N ], profit v i (p) can only be either less than its witness or greater than its witness. Therefore, at most one parameter vector in P can come from each cell, so the maximum number of vectors in P from R is dN d . We chose R to be arbitrary, so this bound holds for all r regions. Therefore, 2 N = |P | ≤ rdN d , which means that N ≤ d log N + log(rd).
We observe that the partitions induced by the mechanism classes we study can be described as hyperplane arrangements. In particular, let v be a fixed valuation vector and consider any mechanism class featured in this paper that is defined by a parameter vector p ∈ X . We show that we can identify a set H of hyperplanes such that the regions induced on X over which profit v (p) is linear are the connected components of X \ H. Buck proved that if X is a subset of R d , then the number of connected components is bounded by [Buck, 1943] . We use this fact to prove the following corollary of Theorem 4.2 in this context. Corollary 4.4. Suppose that for every v ∈ S, there are at most t hyperplanes that partition X into regions such that profit v (p) is linear over any given region. Then R S (F) ≤ O U d log(dt)/N .
Proof. First, each sample in S comes with at most t hyperplanes which partition X into regions where the corresponding profit function is linear. We denote the partition corresponding to v i by P i . Next, the union of all N t hyperplanes also partition X , and we refer to this partition as P.
Notice that for each region R ∈ P and each index i ∈ [N ], R is fully contained within a single region in P i . Therefore, for each region in R ∈ P and for all i ∈ [N ], profit v i (p) is a fixed linear function. This means that r = |P| ≤ d(N t) d [Buck, 1943] . By Lemma 4.3 we see that if S is shatterable, then [Shalev-Shwartz and Ben-David, 2014] . We set x = N, c = 2d, and b = 2 log d + d log t and derive that N ≤ 8d log(4d) + 2(2 log d + d log t) = O(d log(dt)).
We now use these results to prove bounds on the empirical Rademacher complexity of an array of mechanism classes.
Multi-unit pricing mechanisms
We begin by applying Theorem 4.2 to multi-unit pricing mechanisms. Our most general result is for non-linear pricing mechanisms.
Theorem 4.5. Let A and A be the classes of non-linear pricing mechanisms with anonymous and non-anonymous prices, respectively. Then for any sample S of size N ,
Proof. In the case of anonymous prices, any non-linear pricing mechanism is defined by m i=1 (κ i + 1) parameters because that is the number of different bundles. Consumer j will prefer the bundle corresponding to the quantity vector q over the bundle corresponding to the quantity vector q if v j (q) − p(q) ≥ v j (q ) − p(q ). Therefore, there are at most m i=1 (κ i + 1) 2 hyperplanes determining each buyer's preferred bundle -one hyperplane per pair of bundles. This means that there are a total of n m i=1 (κ i + 1) 2 hyperplanes in ( m i=1 (κ i + 1))-dimensional space such that in any one region induced by these hyperplanes, the demand bundles of all n consumers are fixed and profit is linear in the prices of these n bundles. By Corollary 4.4, with d = m i=1 (κ i + 1) and
In the case of non-anonymous prices, the same argument holds, except that every non-linear pricing mechanism is defined by n m i=1 (κ i + 1) parameters -one parameter per bundle per consumer. Therefore, d = n m i=1 (κ i + 1), and the result follows from Corollary 4.4.
We achieve improved bounds when the non-linear prices decompose additively over the items (see the definition of additively decomposable non-linear pricing mechanisms in Section 3.1.1).
Theorem 4.6. Let A and A be the classes of additively decomposable non-linear pricing mechanisms with anonymous and non-anonymous prices, respectively. Then for any sample S of size N ,
Proof. In the case of anonymous prices, any additively decomposable non-linear pricing mechanism is defined by m i=1 (κ i + 1) parameters. As in the proof of Theorem 4.5, there are a total of n m i=1 (κ i + 1) 2 hyperplanes such that in any one region induced by these hyperplanes, the demand bundles of all n consumers are fixed and profit is linear in the prices of these n bundles. By Corollary 4.
In the case of non-anonymous prices, the same argument holds, except that every non-linear pricing mechanism is defined by n m i=1 (κ i + 1) parameters -one parameter per item, quantity, and consumer tuple. Therefore, d = n m i=1 (κ i + 1), and the result follows from Corollary 4.4.
Finally, we apply Theorem 4.2 to menus of two-part tariffs. Proof. In the case of anonymous prices, every length-M menu of two-part tariffs is defined by 2M parameters: the fixed fee and unit price for each of the M menu entries. Consumer j will choose the quantity q and menu entry (p i 0 , p i 1 ) that maximizes v j (q) − p i 0 · 1 q>0 + p i 1 q . Therefore, the quantity q and menu entry that she chooses is determined by (κM ) 2 hyperplanes of the form
In total, there are n(M κ) 2 hyperplanes that determine the menu entry and quantity demanded by all n buyers, over which profit is linear in the fixed fees and unit prices. Therefore, with d = 2M and t = n(M κ) 2 , by Corollary 4.4,
. In the case of non-anonymous reserve prices, the same argument holds, except that every length-M menu of two-part tariffs is defined by 2nM parameters: for each buyer, we must set the fixed fee and unit price for each of the M menu entries. Therefore, d = 2nM , and the result follows from Corollary 4.4.
Single-unit pricing mechanisms
We begin by deriving bounds for the simplest type of single-unit pricing mechanisms: item pricing mechanisms when the buyers have additive valuations. When we say that the buyers are additive (respectively, unit-demand), we mean that the support of the distribution of buyers' values is over additive (respectively, unit-demand) valuations. Proof. For anonymous prices, we appeal to Corollary 4.4. We know that an item i will be bought under the valuation vector v k if there exists a buyer j such that v k j (e i ) ≥ p(e i ). For a sample v k , let v k (e i ) be the maximum amount that any buyer values item i, i.e. v k (e i ) = max j v k j (e i ). Item i is bought under the valuation vector v k if and only if v k (e i ) ≥ p(e i ). Therefore, for each sample, there are at most m hyperplanes determining the set of items bought. On a single region induced by these hyperplanes, profit is a linear function of the prices. Therefore, by Corollary 4.4 with d = m and t = m, we have that
The proof for anonymous prices easily generalizes to the case with non-anonymous prices and we include it below for completeness. We know that an item i will be bought under valuation vector v k if there exists a buyer j such that v k j (e i ) ≥ p j (e i ). Therefore, for each sample, there are at most nm hyperplanes determining the set of items bought. On a single region induced by these hyperplanes, profit is a linear function of the prices. Therefore, by Proof. For unit-demand buyers with anonymous item pricing, each buyer i will buy the item j that maximizes v i (e j ) − p(e j ). Therefore, the outcome of the mechanism is determined by the n m 2 hyperplanes v i (e j ) − p(e j ) = v i (e k ) − p(e k ) for all i ∈ [n] and j, k ∈ [m]. With d = m and t = O(nm 2 ), Corollary 4.4 guarantees the theorem statement. For unit-demand buyers with nonanonymous prices, the only difference is that d = nm, and the theorem holds by Corollary 4.4.
For the generalized class of bundle pricing mechanisms, we prove the following bounds. 
Proof. Every B-pricing mechanism is defined by |B| parameters: the |B| reserve prices. Let p ∈ R |B| be a vector of the reserve prices. Without loss of generality, suppose that Buyer 1 is the first consumer to choose which bundle to buy, then Buyer 2, and so on, until Buyer n has bought his desired bundle. Given a vector of valuations v, Buyer 1's desired bundle will be q so long as v 1 (q) − p(q) ≥ v 1 (q ) − p(q ) for all other bundles q . Therefore, this decision is based on 2 m 2 hyperplanes: one for every pair of bundles. Similarly, each Buyer i's desired bundle will be based on 2 m 2 hyperplanes: v i (q) − p(q) = v i (q ) − p(q ). (Technically, this decision may be based on fewer hyperplanes for all buyers after Buyer 1, since not all items may be available to them when they choose which bundle to buy.) By Corollary 4.4, with t = O n2 2m and d = |B| we have that
If there are non-anonymous reserve prices, then the same reasoning holds, except now there are n i=1 |B i | parameters defining each mechanism. Therefore,
as claimed.
Multi-unit auctions
We now cover the classes of AMAs and VVCAs, which are the only classes with an exponential Rademacher complexity upper bound. This is the best we can hope for, since Balcan et al. also prove an exponential lower bound [Balcan et al., 2016] . 4
Theorem 4.11. Let A be the class of AMAs, let A be the class of VVCAs, and let A be the class of λ-auctions. For any sample S of size N ,
Proof. Every AMA is defined by n + m i=1 κ i +n n ≤ 2 m i=1 κ i +n n parameters since there are n bidder weights and at most m i=1 κ i +n n allocation boosts. Given a vector v of valuations, an allocation Q = (q 1 , . . . , q n ) will be the allocation of the AMA so long as and t = (n + 1) κ i +n n 2 we have that
For the class of VVCAs, the same argument holds except that every VVCA is defined by n+n m i=1 (κ i + 1) parameters, since there are n bidders weights and n m i=1 (κ i + 1) bidder-specific bundle boosts c i,q . Similarly, for the class of λ-auctions, the same argument holds except there are zero bidder weights and m i=1 κ i +n n allocation boosts. Therefore, d = O (n m i=1 κ i ) for VVCAs and d = m i=1 κ i +n n for λ-auctions, and we may again apply Corollary 4.4 to arrive at the theorem statement.
Next, we analyze the class of O-boosted AMAs. Proof. Every O-boosted AMA is defined by n+|O| parameters, since there are n bidders weights and |O| allocation boosts. Fix some valuation vector v. We claim that the allocation of any O-boosted AMA is determined by at most (n+1) m i=1 κ i +n n 2 hyperplanes, where m i=1 κ i +n n is the number of different allocations. To see why this is, notice that the VCG allocation will be the AMA allocation by default unless there exists some Q j = q j 1 , . . . , q j n such that
for all allocations Q k = q k 1 , . . . , q k n . This decision governing which of the m i=1 κ i +n n possible allocations will be the AMA allocation is defined by the m i=1 κ i +n n 2 hyperplanes, one per pair of distinct allocations Q j and Q k . We now give a precise characterization of the hyperplane corresponding to an arbitrary pair Q j and Q k , which depends on whether both allocations are in O, neither are in O, or just one is in O. Therefore, there are three cases:
1. If Q j and Q k are both in O, then Q k will not be allocated by any AMA where the parameters w 1 , . . . , w n , λ Q j , and λ Q k are such that
. This corresponds to a hyperplane in the following way. We will use the notation v j to denote the (n + 1)-dimensional vector consisting of each bidder's value for the allocation Q j , i.e., v j = v 1 q j 1 , . . . , v n q j n . Also, we use the notation v j • e j to denote the vector of valuations v j concatenated with the standard basis vector e j ∈ R |O| , which implies that (w, λ)·v j •e j = w i v i q j i +λ Q j . This notation allows us to conclude that the set of parameter vectors (w, λ) where λ ∈ R |O| under which Q k is never allocated under the corresponding AMA is the halfspace (
2. Without loss of generality, suppose that Q k is in O and Q j is not. Then Q k will not be allocated so long as the parameters w 1 , . . . , w n , and λ Q k are such that
. In other words, the set of parameter vectors (w, λ) where Q k is never allocated are in the halfspace
. This halfspace's separating hyperplane is defined by the equation
3. If neither Q j nor Q k are in O, then by the same reasoning as in the above two cases, one of the m i=1 κ i +n n 2 hyperplanes defining which parameters lead to which AMA allocations on
These m i=1 κ i +n n 2 hyperplanes split the parameter space into regions so that for any two AMAs defined by parameters in the same region, the allocation will be the same. Specifically, given a parameter vector (w, λ), there must be some allocation Q j such that
for all allocations Q k , and therefore Q j is the allocation of the corresponding AMA (or an allocation with the same weighted social welfare, which implies the same profit, and thus we are unconcerned with specific tie-breaking rules). By construction, for any set of parameters in the same region as (w, λ), the allocation of the corresponding AMA will also be Q j .
By a similar argument, it is straightforward to see that m i=1 κ i +n n 2 hyperplanes determine the allocation of any AMA in this restricted space without any one bidder's participation. This leads us to a total of (n + 1) m i=1 κ i +n n 2 hyperplanes which partition the space of O-boosted AMA parameters in a way such that for any two parameter vectors in the same cell, the auction allocations are the same, as are the allocations without any one bidder's participation. Therefore, by Corollary 4.4, setting d = n+|O| and t
A similar proof technique admits the following theorem.
Theorem 4.13. Let A be the class of O-boosted λ-auctions. Then for any sample S of size N ,
Proof. This proof is very similar to that of Theorem 4.12. However, we claim that the allocation of any O-boosted λ-auction is determined by at most (n + 1)(|O| + 1) 2 hyperplanes. This is because without the bidder weights, the VCG allocation is the only unboosted allocation that has any chance of being the allocation of the O-boosted λ-auction. Therefore, there are only (|O| + 1) 2 hyperplanes determining the allocation of the λ-auction, and the same number of hyperplanes determine the allocation of the λ-auction in this restricted space without any one bidder's participation. Therefore, by Corollary 4.4, setting d = |O| and t = (n + 1)(|O| + 1) 2 , we have that
We use Theorems 4.12 and 4.13 to prove the following generalization guarantees regarding k-sparse AMAs and λ-auctions.
Theorem 4.14. Let A be the class of k-sparse AMAs and let A be the class of k-sparse λ-auctions.
Proof. We prove this theorem by effectively spreading the confidence parameter δ over all Oboosted AMAs where |O| = k of which there are at most α := m i=1 κ i +n n k . Let A O be the set of O-boosted AMAs for an arbitrary set of allocations O and let A k be the set of all k-sparse AMAs. By Theorem 4.12 and the generalization guarantee stated in Section 3, we know that for all sets of allocations O such that |O| ≤ k, the probability that there exists an auction 
Single-unit auctions
For the class of VCG auctions with bundle reserve prices, we prove the following theorem. Proof. The VCG auction with anonymous item reserve prices over B is defined by |B| parameters: the |B| reserve prices. Let p ∈ R |B| be a vector of the reserve prices. Given a vector of valuations v, any allocation allocating in total the items in a bundle q will partition them among the bidders in such a way that the social welfare is maximized. Let Q q =1 , . . . ,n be this allocation. This will be the allocation of the auction if it maximizes n i=1 v ii + p (1 − q) since 1 − q is the bundle of items not allocated under Q q . Therefore, the allocation of the auction is determined by at most 2 m 2 hyperplanes: 
Notice that regardless of the reserve prices, if q is comprised of the items allocated in the allocation of an MBARP, then Q q will be the allocation. After all, if (r 1 , . . . , r m ) are the reserve prices of an arbitrary MBARP, then it will always be the case that
r j for any allocation Q = (q 1 , . . . , q n ) ∈ O q by definition of Q q . Next, let R v t q be the subset of R m+1 such that if an MBARP is parameterized by (c, r 1 , . . . , r m ) ∈ R v t q , then the allocation of the MBARP on v t is Q q . This means that if q = 1,
In other words, (c, r 1 , . . . , r m ) ∈ R v t q if and only if it falls in the intersection of 2 m − 1 halfspaces:
Similarly, if q = 1, it is not hard to see that we can write R v t 1 as the intersection of 2 m − 1 halfspaces. The same holds for the MBARP without any one bidder's participation, leading to a total of (n + 1)2 m (2 m − 1) = O n2 2m relevant hyperplanes. Whenever these n + 1 allocations are fixed, the profit is a fixed linear function of the m reserve prices. By 
Structural profit maximization
In this section, we provide a data-dependent methodology by which the mechanism designer can determine a mechanism class which provides him the optimal profit-generalization tradeoff. This tradeoff can be described in terms of two types of profit loss: approximation loss and estimation loss. To understand this trade-off, let opt(D) be the mechanism which maximizes expected profit over the distribution of buyers' values D. Crucially, we do not assume that opt(D) is in the mechanism class A that the mechanism designer is optimizing over. Further, for a set S of N samples from D, with a slight abuse of notation, let A(S) be the mechanism in A which maximizes empirical profit, and let profit D (A(S)) be the expected profit of the mechanism A(S) over D. Similarly, let A(D) be the mechanism in A that maximizes expected profit over D. We can write the true profit loss as the difference between the expected profit of opt(D) and the expected profit of A(S), which decomposes as
In words, approximation loss is the amount of profit lost given that the optimal mechanism, opt(D), is not in the design space A, and estimation loss measures the amount of profit lost given that we do not know the distribution D, but only have samples from D. We note that estimation loss measures what is known as overfitting, a well-known phenomenon in statistics and machine learning. Structural risk minimization is a general technique used in machine learning to pin down the optimal tradeoff between estimation and approximation loss. As mentioned in the introduction, in the case of sample-based mechanism design, we are not minimizing risk, but maximizing profit, so we refer to this process as structural profit maximization (SPM).
We will demonstrate this tradeoff using the abstract notion of a generalization guarantee A (N, δ), as defined in Definition 3.1. For a given class A, the form of A (N, δ) invariably depends on a measure of the class's intrinsic complexity, which we will refer to as c(A). For example, c could be a bound on R S (A), in which case A (N, δ) ≤ 2c(A) + 4U 2 ln(4/δ)/N . Now, suppose that A is a rich class of mechanisms which can be decomposed into a nested sequence of subclasses A 1 ⊆ A 2 ⊆ · · · ⊆ A p = A. For example, if A is the class of AMAs, then A k could be the class of k-sparse AMAs. For any standard complexity measure, we have that c (A 1 ) ≤ c (A 2 ) ≤ · · · ≤ c (A p ). For illustrative purposes, suppose that we do not know the individual complexity terms c (A i ), but we do know the intrinsic complexity c(A) of A and can calculate A (N, δ) . We are thus guaranteed that with probability at least 1 − δ over the draw of a sample S ∼ D N , for all mechanisms A ∈ A, profit D (A) ≥ profit S (A) − A (N, δ) , where profit S (A) is the empirical profit of A over S. Further, it is well known that if A i (S) is the mechanism in A i that achieves maximum empirical profit over S, then the profit of A i (S) is within A (N, δ/2) + U ln(4/δ)/N of the optimal profit achievable by mechanisms in A i . In the left graph of Figure 3 , we illustrate A i (S)'s empirical and expected profit as well as the bound we have on the expected profit given A (N, δ) . Unfortunately, this guarantee does not provide any information about when the mechanism complexity grows to the point where the algorithm begins overfitting.
However, if we can calculate each complexity term c (A i ) individually, as we easily can thanks to our overarching Theorem 4.2, then we can perform a more careful analysis. In particular, we can guarantee that for every mechanism in A i , its empirical profit is within A i (N, δ · w(i)) of its expected profit, where w : N → [0, 1] is a weight function which we explain later in this section.
Further, if A i (S) is again the mechanism in A i which achieves maximum empirical profit over S, then the difference between the expected profit of A i (S) and the expected profit of the optimal mechanism in A i is at most A i (N, δ · w(i)/2) + U ln(4/δ)/N . In the right graph of Figure 3 , we illustrate A i (S)'s empirical and expected profit as well as the bound we have on the expected profit given A i (N, δ · w(i)). This leads us to the notion of a non-uniformly learnable class of mechanisms, upon which SPM can be performed.
Definition 5.1 (Non-uniformly learnable). A class A of mechanisms is non-uniformly learnable if A is the countable union of a set of uniformly learnable classes C = {A 1 , A 2 , . . . } with functions A i bounding the estimation loss of learning over A i . This means that given a weight function w : N → [0, 1] such that ∞ i=1 w(i) = 1, for all δ ∈ (0, 1) and for all distributions D, with probability at least 1 − δ, for all mechanism classes A i such that w(i) = 0 and all mechanisms A ∈ A i , the empirical profit of A is A i (N, δ · w(i))-close to its expected profit.
In effect, the weight function allows us to spread the confidence δ across all mechanism subfamilies in A. Given a non-uniformly learnable class of mechanisms, structural profit maximization is the process of determining the mechanism class A i and the mechanism A ∈ A i such that profit S (A) − A i (N, δ · w(i)) is maximized, since we know that the expected profit of A is at least this value. Further, the following theorem shows that the profit of A is close to optimal. Though this result is well-known for general learning problems, we include the proof for completeness in Appendix A.
Theorem 5.2. Let A(S) be the mechanism that maximizes profit S (A) − min i:A∈A i A i (N, δ · w(i)) and let A * ∈ A be the mechanism that maximizes profit D (A). Then with probability at least 1−2δ, Both the structural decomposition of A into subsets and the assignment w of weights to these subsets allow the mechanism designer to encode any prior knowledge he might have about the buyers. After all, the larger the weight w(i) assigned to a mechanism class A i is, the larger δ · w(i) is, and a larger δ · w(i) implies a smaller A i (N, δ · w(i)), thereby implying stronger guarantees. Where might this prior knowledge come from? Oftentimes, it might come from domain expertise; perhaps the mechanism designer knows that some mechanisms are likely to be more profitable than others, so assigning a higher weight to classes containing those mechanisms will lead to better profit. To present this section's results, we will need the following notation. For an AMA A, let O A be the set of all allocations Q such that λ(Q) > 0 in A. We first derive the following generalization guarantee for the SPM hierarchy consisting of the classes of O-boosted AMAs.
Theorem 5.3. Let A be the class of AMAs and let w be a weight function which maps sets of allocations O to R such that w(O) ≤ 1. Then for any δ ∈ (0, 1), with probability at least 1 − δ over the draw of a sample of size N from D, for any auction A ∈ A, the difference between the average profit of A over the sample and the expected profit of A over D is at most
We prove a similar theorem for the class of anonymous pricing mechanisms, by which we mean the union of all B-pricing mechanisms over all sets of bundles B. For a particular anonymous pricing mechanism A, let B A be the set of bundles with set prices in A.
Theorem 5.4. Let A be the class of anonymous pricing mechanisms and let w be a weight function which maps sets of bundles B to [0, 1] such that w(B) ≤ 1. Then for any δ ∈ (0, 1), with probability at least 1 − δ over the draw of a sample of size N from D, for any mechanism A ∈ A, the difference between the average profit of A over the sample and the expected profit of A over D is at most
.
Theorem 5.3 follows directly from Theorem 4.12 and Theorem 5.4 follows from Theorem 4.10, since we only need to multiply the weight term with δ as it appears in both Theorem 4.12 and 4.10. Theorems 4.7, 4.13, 4.14 and 4.10 similarly imply SPM results for length-M menus of two-part tariffs, O-boosted λ-auctions, k-sparse AMAs, k-sparse λ-auctions, and bundle pricing mechanisms with non-anonymous prices.
Conclusion
In this work, we provide a unifying framework for bounding the complexity of a wide variety of mechanism classes. We characterize structural similarities of mechanism classes ranging from simple take-it-or-leave-it pricing mechanisms to combinatorially challenging VCG-based mechanisms such as affine maximizer auctions. These similarities lead us to an overarching theorem that bounds the empirical Rademacher complexity of these mechanism classes. Despite this theorem's wide applicability, we match and improve over many of the generalization guarantees already provided in the sample-based mechanism design literature. This all-encompassing theorem also allows us to easily bound the complexity of finely grained mechanism hierarchies in one swoop. We then call upon the learning framework known as structural profit maximization in order to show how the mechanism designer can find the precise level of each hierarchy that will provide him with the optimal tradeoff between revenue and generalization.
Our work opens many directions for future exploration. A particularly interesting one is an investigation into data-driven mechanism design from a computational complexity perspective. Assuming full expressiveness, there is an inevitable tradeoff between deriving data-dependent generalization guarantees and computational complexity because scanning the input alone will take an exponential number of steps. Further, empirical Rademacher complexity can be computationally challenging to compute exactly, but it is sometimes possible to formulate a data-dependent upper bound as a convex optimization problem (e.g. [Riondato and Upfal, 2015] ). A similar approach might work here. In another direction, as of yet, there has been no research into generalization guarantees for multi-dimensional sample-based mechanism design when the bidders have valuation profiles other than general, additive, or unit-demand. It would be interesting to see whether the wealth of knowledge regarding other valuation profiles, such as submodular valuations, can lead to improved generalization bounds. 
